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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to long-term improvements in Soviet strategic forces, the 
United States has undertaken a modest but significant program of modernization 
of its strategic forces. Elements of the program will improve the ability of 
the American strategic arsenal to withstand a Soviet counter-force first-strike; 
for example, the multiple-shelter basing mode for the MX will increase dramati­
cally the number of hardened targets the Soviets would need to attack in a 
first-strike, making such an attack much less attractive. Other elements of the 
program will augment the second-strike capability of American nuclear forces 
against the Soviet strategic arsenal; specific actions in this area include the 
MX itself, accuracy improvements in the Trident II missile, and a new cruise 
missile carrier which will be more capable than the B-52G bomber.
However, the strategic balance will not be fully affected by the moderniza­
tion program until the late 1980s. Until then, there is a concern that the 
Soviet Union will improve its forces to the extent that it will temporarily 
achieve strategic superiority over the United States. Hence an interval may 
develop between the present and the late 1980s which will be characterized by a 
strategic imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union, and as a result of this im­
balance, an enfeebled United States. The argument is that the United States, 
fearful of the asymmetric risks of a strategic exchange, would be unwilling to 
take actions necessary to confront and to contain an expansionistic Soviet Union.
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As a corollary, the Soviet Union, mindful that its strategic advantage was only 
temporary, might be all the more aggressive during this period in which it would 
in fact have the advantage at the nuclear level.
Part of this period is of course covered by the proposed SALT II accord.
Indeed, it is argued that the treaty is inadequate as it fails to arrest (and in 
more extreme versions of the argument it is said to augment) the feared improve­
ment in the Soviet strategic position; hence the treaty should be rejected. In 
evaluating the treaty, then, the central military question is this; will the 
Soviet Union develop meaningful strategic superiority during the time period 
conditioned by SALT II? An affirmative answer to this question might lead to the 
conclusion that the 1980s will be a "period of maximum peril" for the United 
States and its allies. To forestall this problem, the United States would need 
to accelerate its modernization program dramatically; in addition, it perhaps 
should end once and for all what might be an illusion that the United States and 
the Soviet Union share a consensus on the desirability of effective arms control— 
and what better way to shatter this "illusion" than by rejecting its symbol, 
SALT II? On the other hand, if it is determined that SALT II would not produce 
strategic balance tilted in favor of the Soviet Union, and might indeed contribute 
to strategic stability, the treaty, in conjunction with the modernization program 
currently planned, should be accepted by the United States.
Of course, if the central question is whether SALT II will allow the Soviets 
to achieve temporary strategic superiority, then the next question that must be 
addressed is as follows; what is the concrete meaning of strategic superiority? 
One presentation of the problem is that, during the 1980s under SALT II, Soviet 
strategic forces would be so improved that, using only a small portion of its 
arsenal, the Soviet Union theoretically could destroy the bulk of the American 
strategic arsenal. American forces might be so degraded that an effective 
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counter-strike could not be executed against the massive quantities of residual 
Soviet systems. Moreover, the United States could not credibly threaten to 
retaliate by attacking Soviet cities and industry, for this would provoke a 
tremendous blow by the Soviet Union against equivalent American targets. In sum, 
the United States would have no effective response to a Soviet attack or threat 
of an attack. The United States would be check-mated at the strategic level, 
allowing the Soviet Union to exploit its superiority at the conventional level,
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and to extract political gains through nuclear blackmail.
These are the conditions of strategic superiority. From them emerge require­
ments of strategic policy which must be satisfied in order to obviate the possi­
bility of Soviet strategic superiority; these requirements are extensions of the 
pre-exchange concepts of assured destruction and essential equivalence to post­
counterforce strategic environments.
The first requirement is that the United States must be able to sustain a 
massive Soviet first-strike against American strategic forces, and then have the 
capability both to launch a retaliatory strike against Soviet nuclear forces and 
still have forces sufficient to deter further Soviet attacks, which would probably 
be against American cities, industries, and other non-hardened targets. In other 
words, after responding to a Soviet counterforce first-strike by launching a 
retaliatory blow against Soviet nuclear forces not used in the first-strike, the 
United States must still retain strategic nuclear forces of such magnitude that, 
should they be used against Soviet cities and industry in response to an escala­
tion by the Soviets to attacks on this category of American targets, they would 
inflict some absolute level of damage unacceptable to the Soviet leadership. 
Because the damage would be unacceptable, and because the Soviet leadership would 
know that it would be inflicted in response to a Soviet attack on American cities 
and industries, the Soviets would be unlikely to escalate the conflict. Indeed, 
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because the Soviet leadership would know that a counterforce attack would not 
lead to a strategic environment in which they could credibly sustain American 
retaliatory attacks at the counterforce and countervalue levels, they would 
have little rational incentive to launch an attack—threats to do so would lack 
credibility and therefore would not be politically effective.
The second requirement is that the relative strategic power of the Soviet 
Union must not increase so greatly if it initiates a counterforce exchange that 
Soviet leaders might be inclined to authorize or to threaten to authorize an 
attack. This requirement goes beyond the first, because it means that the United 
States must not only have the forces capable of inflicting some absolute level of 
damage on Soviet cities and industry after a counterforce exchange initiated by 
the Soviet Union, but in addition the United States must have residual forces 
that maintain the pre-exchange relative balance between the two arsenals. Ful­
fillment of this requirement would persuade the Soviets that, even if they launch 
a first-strike, they will not improve their relative strategic position—this 
means, if the United States is also able to inflict unacceptable damage on the 
Soviet Union at the countervalue level, that the Soviets have nothing to gain 
through initiation or threat of initiation of a strategic exchange. Hence it 
would be unlikely that the Soviets would pursue the nuclear option.
To summarize, one concern about SALT II is that it will make available 
opportunities to the Soviet Union to attain and exploit strategic nuclear superi­
ority during the 1980s. To be certain that SALT would not allow such a situation 
to evolve, during the period of the treaty the United States must be able to 
engage in a counterforce exchange initiated by the Soviet Union, have residual 
forces capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union if the 
conflict should escalate, and the residual forces must be of sufficient magnitude 
that there is no dramatic change in the relative strategic balance. In these 
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circumstances, American deterrence would be of high quality in a strategic 
environment conditioned by SALT II, and there would be few opportunities for 
Soviet adventurism resulting from some perceived strategic imbalance in their 
favor.
The challenge, then, is to assess realistically the strategic balance under 
SALT II; the discussion below attempts to meet this challenge. First, the rele­
vant provisions of SALT II are highlighted, and an estimate is made of Soviet 
and American forces that can be deployed over the life of the treaty. Then an 
analysis is made of Soviet-American nuclear exchanges, and on the basis of various 
measures of strategic effectiveness derived from the concern about the two require­
ments of successful American strategic policy, an assessment is made of the forces 
of each side after counterforce exchanges. The essay concludes with a discussion 
of the policy recommendations emerging from the analysis.
Before we enter the main body of the essay, a brief note of caution must be 
introduced. A discussion of this nature, which involves the estimation of future 
forces, the construction of a model of theoretical exchanges, and an analysis of 
possible residual forces and their likely effectiveness, obviously involves the 
making of several assumptions about a subject marked by great uncertainty. The 
quality of the discussion clearly depends upon the plausibility and integrity of 
these assumptions, for they will fundamentally affect the results of the analysis. 
As will emerge from the essay, an effort has been made to employ plausible assump­
tions, avoiding the extremes of undue optimism and pessimism about the effective­
ness of American forces. However, if there is a bias, it probably is to under­
state slightly the capabilities of the American arsenal, and to overstate Soviet 
capabilities; this slight bias is perhaps necessary if only to be prudent. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that while an effort has been made to employ 
realistic assumptions about the future of the Soviet-American strategic balance 
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if it is determined that some of these assumptions become in need of alteration, 
then it may be necessary as well to reevaluate the findings of the analysis.
II. THE AGREEMENT AND POSSIBLE STRATEGIC FORCES
SALT II is comprised of a Treaty, a Protocol, and a Joint Statement of
4
Principles. The Protocol bans through 1981 the deployment of long-range cruise 
missiles on sea or on land-based platforms, and the deployment of ground and 
air-mobile long range ballistic missiles. The Joint Statement of Principles 
allows each side an opportunity to express for the record its priorities in future 
negotiations on strategic weapons.
The Treaty, binding through 1985, will have the greatest impact of the three 
components of SALT II on the near-term strategic arsenals of the two sides. By 
1982 both may have no more than 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles: Inter­
continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launchers, Submarine Launched Ballistic 
Missile (SLBM) tubes, Heavy Bombers, and any aircraft equipped with long-range 
(i.e., over 600 kilometers) cruise missiles. Within this overall ceiling there 
are three sublimits. First, both sides are limited to a total of 1,320 aircraft 
equipped with long-range cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles equipped with 
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs). Second, of the 1,320, 
no more than 1,200 may be MIRVed ballistic missiles. Finally, of the 1,200, no 
more than 820 may be land-based. Within this limit of 820, the Soviets may 
deploy no more than 308 "heavy" MIRVed ICBMs—the SS-18 or its follow-on which 
may be no larger than the SS-18.
Characteristics of strategic systems are also affected by the Treaty. Any 
test of an ICBM or SLBM with MIRVs renders all missiles of that type classified 
and counted as a MIRVed system, even if some of the missiles of that type have 
only one warhead-carrying reentry vehicle (RV) when actually deployed. If an 
-7-
ICBM is tested with more RVs than previously observed on that missile, then all 
of that size will be classified as a "new type" missile of which each side may 
have only one during the life of the Treaty. Because the Soviets have indicated 
that their "new type" missile is a single-RV replacement for the SS-11, the effect 
is to limit the numbers of RVs on Soviet ICBMs to those levels already tested on 
each of the systems: for the SS-18, 10 RVs; for the SS-19, 6 RVs; and for the
5
SS-17, 4 RVs. (The limit would also apply to a follow-on to any of these sys­
tems.) These provisions limit the U.S. to 7 RVs on Minuteman Ills; however, the 
U.S. probably will limit itself to 3 RVs per booster.
In addition, neither side may deploy more RVs on new ICBMs or SLBMs than have 
been already tested on these two categories of missiles by either the U.S. or the 
U.S.S.R. Hence the "new type" American ICBM may have no more than 10 RVs (the 
number tested on a Soviet SS-18), and new Soviet SLBMs may have no more than 
14 RVs (which were tested on an American C-3). American aircraft to be counted 
against the SALT II limits are B-52s, 3 B-l Prototypes, and any new Cruise Missile 
Carrier (CMC) which the U.S. might deploy. Soviet aircraft limited under SALT II 
are Bears and Bisons, or any follow-on to either, or any aircraft equipped with 
long-range cruise missiles—including the Backfire if it is so equipped in the 
future.6 Finally, Cruise Missile Carriers may be armed with no more than an 
average of 28 cruise missiles.
These SALT II limits, when correlated with information publicly available 
on current and prospective Soviet and American strategic programs, make possible 
the rough estimation of future nuclear forces deployed by each side. Possible 
Soviet and American strategic arsenals, presented in Tables 1 and 2 respectively, 
are estimated for 1985, the last year of the Treaty and the year which reveals 
the full impact of the Treaty on deployment levels. If the Soviets decide to 
build close to the MIRVed ICBM limit, they might deploy 308 SS-18s and a combined 
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total of 500 SS-19s and SS-17s. They could then equip all of their estimated
17 Delta II and Delta III SSBNs with SS-NX-18 MIRVed SLBMs, and still under
SALT II be able to deploy 5 very new Typhoon SSBNs, each with 24 Typhoon MIRVed
SLBMs. These forces would take the Soviets to the 1,200 MIRVed ballistic missile 
limit. On unMIRVed missiles, the Soviets could deploy SS-NX-17 SLBMs (which 
have three RVs that cannot be targeted independently) in all of their 34 Yankee 
class SSBNs and estimated 12 Delta I SSBNs, yielding a total of 688 unMIRVed
SLBMs. If the Soviets continue to have no fewer than 140 SALT-accountable bombers, 
they would then be constrained to 222 unMIRVed ICBMs, probably a follow-on to the
7
SS-11 (1,200 + 688 + 140 + 222 = 2,250, the SALT II limit). Adding 250 Backfires 
(which do not come under SALT II limits but which may have a strategic role), 
the Soviets might have a total of 2,500 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by 
1985.
An important feature of the American force estimate is the exclusion of the
MX missile from the U.S. arsenal in either a fixed or partially mobile basing 
mode; this reflects the judgement that the development and testing phases of the 
MX program will take initial deployment (if the U.S. decides to do so) beyond 1985.' 
In order to equip 120 B-52s with cruise missiles, and to pursue the Trident SSBN 
program within the SALT II limits, the U.S. might need to retire one Poseidon SSBN 
three years ahead of schedule, to destroy about 50 Minuteman III silos, and to
9 
deploy 9 rather than the currently planned 10 Tridents by 1985. Given Treaty 
constraints, the U.S. arsenal in 1985 might include 500 Minuteman III MIRVed
ICBMs, 288 C-3 MIRVed SLBMs in 18 Poseidon SSBNs, 408 C-4 (Trident I) MIRVed 
SLBMs in 12 Poseidon and 9 Trident SSBNs, and 120 B-52 Cruise Missile Carriers, 
yielding a total force of 1,316 MIRVed missiles and Cruise Missile Carriers (the 
limit, again, is 1,320).10 Some 341 B-52s will be SALT-accountable, even though 
80 of these are conventionally equipped B-52DS. With 120 B-52GS deployed as
-9
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Table 1 (continued); Sources
a. ICBM figures are explained in the text. The figure for Yankee SSBNs is 
from Senate POD Hearings, FY 1979, Pt. 1, p. 526. The total of 29 Delta class 
SSBNs is from POD FY 1980 Report, p. 72. In January 1976, the Soviets were 
reported to have 11 Delta I SSBNs (Senate POD Hearings, FY 1977, Pt. 1, p. 399); 
the following year the production of both Delta I and Delta II SSBNs were reported 
(Senate POD Hearings, FY 1978, Pt. 1, p. 382); and in February 1978 it was 
reported that production of Delta I SSBNs had ceased (Senate POD Hearings, FY 1979, 
Pt. 1, p. 426). Hence it is estimated that the Soviets deployed 12 Delta I's 
and 17 Delta Il's and Ill's. This would permit them to deploy 5 new Typhoon SSBNs, 
and to deploy MIRVed ICBMs close to the SALT II limit.
b. On the SS-18, Peter Hughes, "SALT II and the Emerging Strategic Threat,"
Air Force Magazine, (March 1979), p. 49; for the MIRVed ICBMs, the SS-NX-17 and 
SS-NX-18, and the bombers, see U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, 
Background Paper; Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, 
(January 1978), p. 16. The Typhoon characteristics are explained in the text.
c. Yield for the SS-18 is from Hughes, p. 49; for the SS-11 FO, see Paul H. Nitze, 
"Considerations Bearing on the Merits of an Agreement," (Washington: 6 March 1979), 
p. 5; for the Typhoon, see text; for all others, see CBO Background Paper, p. 16.
d. Accuracy is expressed as circular error probable (CEP): the probability that 
one-half the warheads aimed at a particular point will land within the area of a 
circle whose radius is the stated CEP figure. For MIRVed ICBMs, see Hughes, p. 16; 
for SLBMs, CBO Background Paper, p. 16.
e. EMT is nominal yield to the two-thirds power.
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Table 2 (continued): Sources
a. The U.S. is assumed to maintain its current force of single-RV ICBMs;
for these, and for the mix of MK12 and MK.12A warheads of MMIIIs, see POD FY 1980 
Report, p. 66. On SLBMs, see footnotes 9 and 10; on bombers, see Senate POD 
Hearings, FY 1979, Pt. 9, p. 6816.
b. The estimates for bomber warhead loadings are based on appropriation requests 
for SRAM internal rotary launchers and external pylons; see Senate POP Hearings, 
FY 1979, Pt. 9, p. 6822. The number of bombs was revealed during these hearings. 
On the number of SRAMs per pylon (the number per internal launcher was noted in 
the hearings listed above), see Air Force Magazine, (May 1977), p. 126.
c. Yields and accuracies are from CBO Background Paper, p. 19.
d. EMT is nominal yield to the two-thirds power.
stand-off platforms for cruise missiles, about 141 B-52Gs and B-52Hs actually 
would be available as penetrator bombers. Adding 54 Titan II and 450 Minuteman II 
unMIRVed ICBMs, the total U.S. SALT-accountable force would be about 2,041 
delivery vehicles. When 66 FB-lllAs equipped for strategic missions are included, 
and 80 B-52Gs excluded, then the U.S. might have a total of 2,027 strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles by 1985.
In looking at the estimated characteristics of the two arsenals, note that 
those of the U.S.S.R. are especially difficult to determine; this is due to the 
extreme sensitivity of U.S. efforts to learn of these characteristics (the Soviet 
lack of forthrightness need only be mentioned). Hence fairly conservative figures 
have been chosen; for example, the estimate of 0.1 nautical mile accuracy for 
the Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, and the assumption of a 20 megaton RV for the SS-11 
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follow-on, are the most favorable from the Soviet viewpoint that could be found
/ 
in open literature. In addition, estimates of the number (14) and yield (100 
kilotons) for the Typhoon SLBM are based on the SALT RV limit for SLBMs, and the 
presumption that the Soviets want their RVs to be larger than those on comparable 
U.S. systems (i.e., the 40 kiloton RV on the C-3). On the other hand a new Soviet 
strategic bomber may be deployed soon, and its weapons capabilities may exceed 
those of the Bear and the Bison.
In contrast to the uncertainty about Soviet force characteristics, there is 
substantial public knowledge about the capabilities of American strategic forces. 
The estimate for C-3 SLBMs is somewhat optimistic, from the American viewpoint, 
for the assumed level of 14 RVs is greater than that sometimes reported by private 
sources.The rationale for the larger number is that, first, it is the figure 
usually given by official U.S. sources, and second, as patrol areas of American 
SSBNs increase with the introduction of Trident SSBNs and the retrofitting of 
C-4 SLBMs into some Poseidon SSBNs, remaining Poseidons with C-3s will be able to 
move closer to their targets and therefore trade-off somewhat less range for more 
RVs per booster. In contrast to the optimism on the C-3, U.S. bomber capabilities 
may be underestimated in this analysis (comparable information on Soviet bombers 
is unavailable). For example, rather than the total number of SALT-accountable 
bombers, the strategic exchanges discussed below employ only those U.S. bombers 
which are unquestionably equipped for strategic missions (thus excluding the 
B-52Ds), and which are in combat-ready units (these bombers are referred to as 
"Unit Equipment" by the U.S. Air Force), and are not undergoing repair or modern­
ization. Sustained tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. might cause these 
bombers to be introduced into the strategic arsenal. Also, estimates of warhead 
loadings are based on how the Air Force might actually equip its bombers (this 
is accomplished by evaluating Air Force budgetary requests); these loadings are 
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less than the potential weapons-carrying capabilities of the bombers (the excep­
tion to this is the B-52 CMC; budgetary analysis suggests it will carry the 
maximum number of cruise missiles possible).
III. SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC EXCHANGES
Given these two arsenals conditioned by SALT II, we can estimate the results 
of plausible counterforce exchanges between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and their 
residual forces can then be compared. The discussion will focus on exchanges 
initiated by the U.S.S.R.; this reflects the central concern of the entire 
exercise—assessing the impact of SALT II on U.S. deterrence capabilities.
The first task is to locate measures of post-exchange residual capabilities 
which reflect most accurately upon the assured destruction and essential equiva­
lence requirements of U.S. strategic policy. One possibility is strategic throw 
weight—the weight of warheads and associated instrumentation carried by various 
delivery systems. This is a helpful measure of the potential destructive capa­
bilities of various delivery systems in terms of the number and yield of warheads 
they might carry. However, given the SALT II limits on the number of RVs a missile 
may carry, and the number of cruise missiles an aircraft may transport, throw 
weight potentials can no longer be translated into enhanced actual strategic 
capabilities, and therefore throw weight is an inappropriate measure of residual 
strategic power.
The discussion on throw weight suggests that numbers of warheads is a measure 
of post-exchange capabilities which should be evaluated. It reflects the concerns 
of those who, before the SALT II limits on warheads were announced, predicted that 
the Soviets would translate their throw weight advantages into superiority in
12 
RVs, and it reflects the importance SALT II places on limiting warhead loadings.
It also bears upon the ability of the U.S. to meet its post-exchange strategic 
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requirements, for the number of relatively soft targets (Paul Nitze has noted 
that they would constitute the bulk of targets in both countries after a counter­
force exchange) that can be attacked is directly related to increases in the 
number of separately targetable weapons.13 Warheads, of course, vary in destruc­
tive energy, and a measure is therefore employed, equivalent megatonnage (EMT), 
which reflects differences in warhead yields, and which also accounts for the 
"wastage" of destructive energy experienced by large warheads against all but the
14 largest targets of concern to both sides after a counterforce exchange.
The next tasks of analysis are to select and to vary factors that would affect
15the outcomes of strategic exchanges. The comprehensiveness of the selection of 
factors, and the realistic variation of the most salient among them, clearly de­
termines the quality of the analysis. For example, two possible variables affect­
ing a Soviet attack on American ICBMs are RV accuracy degradation (resulting from 
operational as opposed to test-firing of missiles), and strategic fratricide (the 
possibility that the detonation of one RV over a missile silo will degrade or
16destroy other RVs attacking the same silo). While these factors clearly would 
affect current Soviet counterforce capabilities, as accuracy and system relia­
bilities improve, these factors will become less salient. Indeed, system improve­
ments may render the kill probabilities of one RV almost as high as those for
2 RVs, and therefore a Soviet attack planner might become satisfied with the 
effectiveness of one RV, and a second RV might be targeted against a silo as a
17 kind of insurance that at least one of the RVs would actually detonate.
On the American side, two major factors affecting its capacity to respond 
in-kind to the Soviet attack are the ability of U.S. bombers to escape from their 
bases while under attack from Soviet SLBMs, and then their ability to evade Soviet 
air defenses and deliver their weapons on Soviet missile silos not used in the
18
first strike. So long as the Soviets do not have the tested capability to 
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launch SLBMs on depressed trajectories (cutting SLBM flight times to U.S. air 
bases), a capability they have not yet demonstrated but which is theoretically 
possible, most if not all U.S. B-52s and FB-llls on ground-alert might escape. 
However, the present analysis assumes that only 80% of the B-52s and 85% of the
19 
FB-llls (which are faster on take-offs) on alert survive the Soviet SLBM attack.
In terms of delivery of weapons, U.S. forces today are expected to be able to 
evade Soviet air defenses with relative ease, and hard targets (such as ICBM silos) 
are reported to be lightly defended. By 1985, however, B-52 penetrating bombers 
could face a combination of Soviet air-borne radar and communications (AWACs), 
interceptors, and Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), while B-52 CMCs might have to 
face AWACs and interceptors. Therefore, B-52 penetrators which survive the SLBM 
attack are assumed to have only a 70% probability of evading Soviet air defenses 
and reaching their targets; 85% of the smaller and faster FB-llls are assumed to 
do so; and 85% of the B-52 CMCs that survived the SLBM attack are assumed to 
reach locations off the Soviet borders from which they release their cruise
20missiles.
A variable which is both salient and amenable to analysis is the assumed rate 
of alert of the two forces before a counterforce exchange. At the extremes are 
exchanges which could take place between forces on routine alert, and exchanges 
between fully alerted forces. The first would result from a Soviet attack "out 
of the blue"; the second would be the climax of a Soviet-American crisis of no 
less than two weeks in duration. The first exchange serves as one basis for U.S. 
force planning; the second is one way (and perhaps the major way) U.S. officials 
believe an exchange might actually take place. As former Secretary of Defense 
Schlesinger stated, a Soviet attack, "...would most likely be preceded by a series 
of crises, and certainly by a sharp deterioration in our relations with the
21Soviet Union." The Secretary noted that in these circumstances all U.S. strategic 
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bombers would be placed on ground alert; other officials have stated that all 
SSBNs not in overhaul would be sent out to sea within roughly the same period of
22 
time. In addition, Soviet efforts to send their SSBNs to sea (on a routine 
basis only 15% of Soviet SSBNs are presently at sea; the analysis here assumes 
an increase to 30% by 1985, resulting from improvements in Soviet patrol capa­
bilities) , and their efforts to evacuate their cities as part of civil defense
23 
policies, would give several days warning to the United States. Between these 
two extremes, a third possibility is explored: an exchange between day-to-day 
forces in which U.S. bombers are kept at a 50% alert rate rather than 30% as at 
present.
Holding performance characteristics of delivery systems constant, and varying 
the alert rates of the forces, we can then plot the results of counterforce 
exchanges. The Soviet Union employs their ICBMs against American ICBM silos, and 
their SLBMs against U.S. bomber bases and SSBN ports. The Soviets launch their 
ICBMs and SLBMs simultaneously, in order to minimize the warning time given to 
U.S. bombers. Soviet SLBMs, taking 10-15 minutes to reach U.S. bomber bases, and 
much less to reach submarine ports on the U.S. coast (as well as Guam and Scotland), 
detonate over U.S. and allied territories between 15 and 20 minutes before Soviet 
ICBMs reach American ICBM silo fields. The Americans therefore have 30 minutes 
warning that the Soviets have done something with their missile forces, and up to 
20 minutes pass between the time Soviet missiles detonate over American territory
24 and the time Soviet ICBMs can reach their targets—U.S. missile silos. Whether 
the Americans could be able to react within either of these two time frames, and 
release their ICBMs, must be a disturbing question for Soviet strategic planners; 
for this discussion it is assumed that the American ICBMs are not released—the 
Americans decide to "ride-out" the full Soviet counterforce assault.
When the Americans do retaliate, they follow three courses of action. First
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the Americans allocate some of their surviving ICBMs against Soviet SSBN bases. 
Second, other surviving ICBMs (those with greater accuracy—the Minuteman Ills) 
are employed against Soviet ICBMs (the exception is the case of fully alerted 
forces, when all surviving Minuteman Ills are retained). Third, American bombers 
are sent against Soviet ICBMs not used in the initial Soviet attack; however, 
as with ICBMs, the Americans try to keep some bombers in reserve, in order to avoid 
complete reliance upon their SSBNs at sea to deter further Soviet attacks after 
the exchange. The Americans do not attempt to attack Soviet bombers, for these 
are assumed to have been widely dispersed among several Soviet air bases as soon 
as the Soviet first-strike began. Finally, Soviet and American submarines at sea 
are assumed to be invulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
IV. ANALYSIS OF POST-EXCHANGE STRATEGIC RESIDUALS
The calculations for the exchanges are found in Appendix I; using the RV 
and EMT information in Tables 1 and 2, the post-counterforce exchange residuals 
of the two forces can be derived, and the effectiveness of the American post­
exchange force can then be assessed. First consider the requirement that the U.S. 
maintain an absolute capability to inflict unacceptably high levels of damage 
upon the U.S.S.R. after a counterforce exchange. One analyst has argued that 
1,047 40-kiloton RVs could threaten the 200 largest Soviet cities, placing at 
risk 30% of the total Soviet population and 62% of the industrial capacity of the
25U.S.S.R. Hence one measure of U.S. absolute capabilities after an exchange is 
the ratio of total U.S. residual RVs to the 1,047 RV requirement.
Another measure is the ratio of total U.S. post-exchange EMT to the total 
amount of EMT needed to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. A very 
reliable estimate is that 200 EMT could destroy at least 21% of the population, 
and 72% of the industry of the Soviet Union; 400 EMT raises the proportions
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26destroyed, respectively, to 30% and 76%. Note, however, that neither the RV
nor the EMT figures account for extensive and successful Soviet civil defense,
27
the significance of which is still a matter of conjecture. The analyst who 
derived the RV measure assumed an average hardness of 5 psi per structure attacked 
in the 200 Soviet cities; if the hardness were increased to 10 psi, representing 
an extremely extensive civil defense effort, then 2,512 RVs rather than 1,047 RVs
28
would be required to threaten the 200 largest Soviet cities. Also, to account 
for Soviet civil defense in this discussion, 400 EMT may be considered the adequate 
level of assured destruction capability required by the U.S. (rather, as in the 
1960s, the highest level considered necessary), with damage from 200 EMT considered 
the absolute minimum required by the U.S. (rather than considering it the amount
29
quite sufficient as, again, in the 1960s).
The resulting U.S. assured destruction ratios are found in Table 3:
Table 3. Ratio of U.S. Residual Forces to Assured Destruction Requirements
Alert Rate
(Pre-exchange)
Total RVs
(Residual)
RVs/1,047 RVs/2,512 Total EMT
(Residual)
EMT/200 EMT/400
Routine
Alert Status 4426 4.22 1.76 785.7 3.93 1.96
Enhanced Routine
Alert Status 4826(4626) 4.60(4.42) 1.93(1.84) 987.5(904.6) 4.94(4.52) 2.47(2.26)
Fully-Generated
Alert Status 7943 7.58 3.16 1713.3 8.56 4.26
In what might be the worst of plausible circumstances (i.e., a Soviet attack 
would achieve surprise, and Soviet civil defense is considered quite effective), 
the United States would still have about 75% more RVs than are necessary to inflict 
unacceptable levels of damage on the Soviet Union. (Recall, again, that the RV 
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measure understates American assured destruction capabilities, for the RV ratios 
assume that all weapons have a 40 kiloton yield; in reality many of the U.S. 
residual RVs would have 100 and 200 kiloton yields.) If Soviet civil defense were 
ineffective, the U.S. would have at least four times the number of RVs necessary 
to meet its assured destruction requirements. In terms of EMT, the day-to-day 
American force would possess almost four times the minimum and almost two times 
the maximum levels needed for U.S. requirements. Finally, after an exchange be­
tween Soviet and American forces which have both been fully alerted, the United 
States would have between three and seven times the RVs, and between four and 
almost nine times the EMT needed to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on the 
Soviet Union should the conflict continue and escalate.
Turning to relative capabilities after a strategic exchange, these are sum­
marized in Table 4, which indicates RVs and EMT as ratios of the total Soviet 
force to the total American force before an exchange, and the ratios which emerge 
after counterforce exchanges:
Table 4. Ratio of Soviet to American Forces Before and After Counterforce Exchanges
Alert Rate Measures
(Pre-exchange) Reentry Vehicles Equivalent Megatonnage
Before After % Change Before After % Change
Day-to-Day .82 .62 -24.4 2.01 4.24 +112
Enhanced
Day-to-Day n ,57(.56) -30.5(-31.7) II 3.5(2. 43) +74(+24)
Fully-Generated n .60 -26.7 II 1.67 -16.9
In terms of RVs, before an exchange the Soviet total force has four-fifths
the number of RVs in the American total force. After an exchange involving forces
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on day-to-day alert, the Soviets would have only three-fifths as many RVs, a 
deterioration in their relative position of about 24%. If the exchange were to 
take place between fully-alerted forces, the deterioration in the Soviet position 
would approach 27%. When measured in terms of EMT, the Soviets greatly enhance 
their position—by about 112%—if the exchange takes place between forces on 
routine alert. Between fully-alerted forces, however, a counterforce exchange 
would cause the Soviets to experience a 17% decline in their relative capabilities 
in terms of EMT.
V. ASSESSMENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Under the best of plausible circumstances, Soviet leaders could not expect 
a first-strike against U.S. forces to render the Americans unable both to respond 
in-kind and be able afterwards to inflict unacceptable damage on the U.S.S.R. if 
the conflict were to continue and escalate. Hence the first requirement of U.S. 
strategic policy can be met in the context of SALT II. Second, while the U.S.S.R. 
could possibly expect to achieve a substantial improvement in its relative position 
in terms of EMT after an attack on U.S. day-to-day forces, if the exchange takes 
place after the U.S. receives modest warning, then the U.S.S.R. would experience 
a deterioration in its capabilities as measured in relative EMT. Regardless of 
the circumstances, the Soviets can only expect a counterforce exchange to result 
in a decline in their relative strategic power in terms of residual reentry 
vehicles. Therefore, while the margin of safety is not as high as in the case of 
meeting assured destruction requirements, the United States in a SALT II context 
can be confident that it would continue to meet the requirements for post-exchange 
essential equivalence in RVs under all circumstances, and in EMT under likely 
circumstances.
On the other hand, as can be noted in Appendix I, an exchange between Soviet 
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and American forces on routine alert would result in one major asymmetry: the 
Soviets would have a much more diverse arsenal in terms of delivery systems. After 
all exchanges the Soviets would have a very balanced mix of ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
bombers. In contrast, the day-to-day U.S. residual force could be comprised of 
only 22 ICBMs and 7 bombers—the vast majority of U.S. residual capabilities would 
reside in its submarines. This lack of diversity is remedied if the exchange 
takes place between fully-alerted forces: in this case the Soviet force remains 
balanced, and the American arsenal would have 57 ICBMs, a vast SSBN force, and 
quite importantly, 96 bombers.
Nevertheless, in light of the Soviet gain in relative EMT if the projected 
U.S. day-to-day force is attacked, and given the lack of diversity in the U.S. 
arsenal which would result, an American decision in favor of SALT II might best 
be taken in conjunction with an increase in the routine alert rate for U.S. bombers 
from 30% as at present to a higher rate—perhaps 50%, as in the 1960s. With an 
enhanced bomber alert rate the U.S. could respond in two general ways to a Soviet 
first-strike. If diversity is considered essential, the enhanced bomber alert 
rate would leave the United States with 35 (rather than 7) bombers after a counter­
force exchange, and 23 of these would be Cruise Missile Carriers. Even with this 
more diverse force the Soviet advance in relative EMT would be cut from 112% to 
74%. If cutting deeply into the Soviet relative EMT advantage is considered more 
important, the U.S. could allocate more bombers to its counterforce response. In 
this situation, an enhanced bomber alert allows the U.S. to cut the advance in 
EMT the Soviets could expect via a first-strike from 112% to 24%. Even with the 
allocation of more bombers to a counterforce response, a residual American arsenal 
with the enhanced bomber alert rate is more diverse than an arsenal with a 30% 
bomber alert rate; after a counterforce exchange, the former would still have 
23 bombers, rather than 7 bombers as would be the residual for the latter. Hence
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over the life of the Treaty, or until the U.S. is able to deploy partially-mobile 
ICBMs or large numbers of modified commercial aircraft equipped with cruise mis­
siles (the latter would allow B-52 CMCs to be reconverted into penetrating bombers), 
an enhanced bomber alert rate would make a substantial contribution to U.S. stra- 
4- 1 • 30tegic policy.
In conclusion, under likely circumstances the United States will be able to 
meet its strategic requirements in a SALT II context, and with relatively minor 
alterations in its operations, under virtually all plausible circumstances the 
United States will meet the requirements for a successful strategic policy. That 
is, the American arsenal will be of such power during this period that the Soviet 
Union could not expect to gain militarily or politically through the use or the 
threat of use of nuclear weapons. Based on this analysis, there is no "open door" 
opened by SALT II to Soviet adventurism.
Of course, as noted in the introduction, this assessment is made on the basis 
of assumptions formulated in a context of great uncertainty. There are some 
actions that could be taken by the Soviet Union that could affect the strategic 
balance dramatically. One in particular should be noted: if the Soviets were to 
develop and to test submarine-launched missiles fired on depressed trajectories, 
then their theoretical flight-time to American air bases would be reduced to a 
very great degree; the bombers would then have much less time to scramble after 
the initiation of a Soviet attack. The result of depressed-trajectory SLBMs 
would probably be a significant deterioration in American air-based counterforce 
and residual capabilities. This problem of depressed-trajectory SLBMs places 
important responsibilities on American monitoring capabilities, and should be one 
focus of American attention in SALT III.
Assuming, however, that over the life of the treaty the Soviets do not deploy 
new and particularly destabilizing capabilities, and assuming that the Soviets 
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comply with the provisions of the treaty, then one may be quite confident that 
the strategic balance under SALT II simply will not so favor the Soviets that 
they will engage in adventurism. Of course, the treaty by itself will not cause 
strategic stability; that, in fact, is the result of the treaty and the level, 
quality, and diversity of American forces which have been or are about to be 
deployed. However, the treaty does impose real constraints on Soviet strategic 
programs, especially in terms of imposing trade-offs between placing MIRVs in 
ICBMs and SLBMs, and in terms of limiting their ability to translate strategic 
throw weight into additional numbers of warheads. (Indeed, the true importance 
of this limit on warheads will be felt not during the period covered by SALT II 
but later, when it will prevent the Soviets from matching the increases in 
American first-strike targets resulting from the MX basing-mode—but that is 
another story.) In sum, from a strictly military point of view, SALT II will not 
detract from, and it may contribute modestly to American national security, and 
should therefore be ratified by the United States Senate.
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Appendix I
Case 1. Both Forces on Day-to-Day Alert
The Soviet Attack
The Soviets attack 1004 U.S. ICBMs with 2 SS-18 RVs per target, or a total 
of 201 SS-18s. Against each of 34 U.S. air bases and 5 SSBN bases, the Soviets 
employ 6 RVs from SS-NX-17 SLBMs, which, with a system reliability of 85%, ensures 
5 detonations over each target. The United States has 55% of its Poseidon SSBNs 
and 66% of its Trident SSBNs at sea, while the Soviets have 30% of their SSBNs 
on patrol.31 As has been mentioned, 30% of the U.S. bombers are on alert.
32
Damage expectancies for the SS-18 are as follows:
Yield: .75 Megatons
Accuracy (CEP): 0.1 nautical miles
System Reliability 85
Target Hardness: 2000 psi
SSKP33:: .86
Damage Expectancy (1 RV) : .73
Damage Expectance (2 RVs) : .93
The Soviet attack is as follows:
Allocate 108 RVs 900 RVs 400 RVs 600 RVs 234 RVs
Attack 54 Titan II 450 MMII 200 MMIII 300 MMIII 39 air and sub bases
Kill 51 419 186 279 39
Survivors 3 31 14 21 0
Soviet Forces used in attack: 201 SS-18s, 78 SS-NX-17s.
The American Response
The U.S. keeps SSBNs at sea in reserve. It does not attmept to attack Soviet 
bombers—they are too dispersed. All surviving Titan Ils and 9 MMIIs are allocated
34against two Soviet SSBN bases. All MMIIIs are targeted against SS-18s not used 
in the Soviet first-strike. After keeping in reserve 7 B-52HS, all other bombers 
are used against Soviet ICBM silos. U.S. bomber availability is as follows:
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Type On Alert Survive SLBM Attack Survive Air Defense Total Hard Target
Weapons
B-52 CMC 36 29 25 500
B-52G 9 7 5 20
B-52H 18 14 10 40
FB-111 18 15 13 26
B-52HRes 9 7
Damage expectancies for U.S. hard target weapons are as follows:
Type Yield (MT) CEP (NM) Rel. Target SSKP DE (1 RV)
MMIII MK12 .17 .1 .85 2000 psi .53 .45
MMIII MK12A .35 .1 If II .72 .61
Cruise Missile .20 .05 II II .95 .80
Gravity Bomb 1.0 .05 II II .99 .84
The American counterattack is in two waves:
A. MMIII Attack
Allocate 63 MK12A RVs 42 MK12 RVs
Attack 63 SS-18 42 SS-18
Kill 38 19
Survivors 25 + 23 + 2 not attacked = 50 SS-18s
B. Bomber Attack
Allocate 50 bombs 36 bombs 329 CMs 135 CMs 34 CMs
Attack 50 SS-18 36 SS-19 329 SS-19 135 SS-17 34 SS-11 FO
Kill 42 30 263 108 27
Survive 8 6 66 27 7
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Residuals
The Soviet Union
Type Number Total RVs Total EMT
SS-18 8 “
SS-19 72 815 1951.3
SS-17 27
SS-11 FO 195 _
SS-NX-17 130 '
SS-NX-18 80 1302 359.4
Typhoon 48 _
Bear 100 '
Bison 40 640 1024.0
Backfire 250 .
Totals 950 2757 3334.7
The United States
Type Number Total RVs Total EMT
MMII 22 22 22
C-3 160 "1 4288 702.4
C-4 256 J
B-52H 7 116 61.4
Totals 445 4426 785.8
Case 2. Enhanced American Day-to-Day Alert
The Soviet first-strike against American forces is as in Case 1; however, 
50% rather than 30% of the U.S. bombers are on alert. In Case 1, all but 7 B-52HS 
were allocated to the American counterforce response; in Case 2, either 23 or 11 
B-52 CMCs are held in reserve, as are 12 B-52Hs. The attack on Soviet SSBN ports 
is as in Case 1, as is the Minuteman attack on SS-18s. The attack follows:
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Allocate 50 bombs 94 bombs 271 CMs
Attack 50 SS-18 94 SS-19 271 SS-19
Kill 42 79 217
Survivors 8 15 54
135 CMs 14 CMs or 214 CMs
135 SS-17 14 SS-11 FO 214 SS-11 FO
108 11 171
27 3 (+ 208 43 (+ 8
= 211) = 51)
Residuals
The Soviet Union
Type Number Total RVs Total EMT
SS-18 8
SS-19 69
813 (653) 2053.7 (874.5)
SS-17 27
SS-11 FO 211 (51)
SS-NX-17
258 1302 359.4
SS-NX-18 _
Bear
Bison 390 640 1024.0
Backfire
Totals 963 (803) 2755 (2595) 3437.1 (2257.9)
The United States
Type Number Total RVs Total EMT
MMII 22 22 22.0
C-3
416 4288 702.3
C-4
B-52 CMC 23 (11) 460 (220) 157.9 (75.02)
B-52H 12 216 105.3
Totals 473 (461) 4986 (4746) 989.5 (904.6)
-29-
Case 3. Both Forces on Full Alert
A crisis of no less than 16 days in duration precedes this exchange. Both 
sides have sufficient warning to place all combat-ready aircraft on alert, and 
to place all SSBNs not in overhaul out to sea. About one-third of all Soviet 
SSBNs except its Typhoons are estimated to be in overhaul and cannot be dispersed, 
while an estimated 20% of U.S. Poseidons are in overhaul and also cannot be sent 
to sea. All Typhoons and Tridents can be sent to sea, for none have been in
35 
service the time period requiring an overhaul.
The Soviet attack is similar to earlier cases. The American response is 
different in that all surviving MMIIIs are retained for there are sufficient 
bomber forces available to attack all Soviet silos. Indeed, after allowing for 
attrition, the U.S. is able to retain a sizable B-52 CMC and B-52H force. The 
employment of Titan Ils and MMIIs against Soviet SSBN bases is similar to the 
earlier cases. The attack follows:
Allocate 107 bombs 183 bombs 182 CMs 135 CMs 222 CMs
Attack 107 SS-18 183 SS-19 182 SS-19 135 SS-17 222 SS-11 FO
Kill 90 154 146 108 178
Survivors 17 29 36 27 44
Residuals
The Soviet Union
Type
SS-18
SS-19
SS-17
SS-11 FO
SS-NX-17 
SS-NX-18 
Typhoon 
Bear 
Bison 
Backfire 
Totals
Number Total RVs Total EMT
17
65
27
44 J
712 876.6
386 '
208 3462 968.8
120 _
390 640 1024.0
1257 4814 2869.4
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The United States
Type Number Total RVs Total EMT
MMII 22 '
MMIII MK12 14 127 66.2
MMIII MK12A 21
C-3 224 "
6144 1013.7
C-4 376 J
B-52 CMC 62
1672 633.4
B-52H 24
Totals 743 7943 1713.3
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